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Many of the crucial debates in development economics are
encapsulated in the question of economic convergence. Is there a
tendency for the poorer countries to grow more rapidly than the
richer countries, and thereby to converge in living standards?
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I. Introduction
Many of the crucial debates in development economics are encapsulated in
the question of economic convergence. Is there a tendency for the poorer
countries to grow more rapidly than the richer countries, and thereby to converge
in living standards? Or instead, are there tendencies for the 11 rich to get
richer, and the poor to get poorer, 11 so that the gap between rich and poor
nations tends to widen over time?
An enormous professional debate over this issue has been underway during
the past decade, instigated by several theoretical and empirical insights. Paul
Romer (1986) provided a major spur to the debate by introducing a theoretical
growth model with increasing-returns-to-scale production technology, which
results in a strong tendency for rich countries to maintain or even increase
their lead over poorer countries. Romer stressed that the more standard
technology assumptions of the Solow growth model lead to the presumption that the
poorer countries would experience faster growth1 • Romer noted that his
theoretical model with increasing returns to scale seemed to be broadly
consistent with the cross-country growth experience of the post-war era, in which
there was no discernable trend for the poorer nations to converge with the richer
nations. 2
Romer's point about the absence of convergence is evident in Figure 1. We
graph on the x-axis the' 1970 level of per capita income of several dozen
developing countries, and on the y-axis the growth of per capita income between
1 More precisely, as Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) have clarified, the
Solow model predicts conditional convergence: countries will have different
steady state income levels, but after controlling for the determinants of the
steady state income level, the poorer countries should grow faster than richer
countries.
2 He was also careful, however, to point out the problem of interpreting
such simple correlations:
Cross-country comparisons of growth rates are complicated by the
difficulty of controlling for political and social variables that appear
to strongly influence the growth process.
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~970-89.3 If convergence predominated in the data, then we would find a
negative relationship between initial income in 1970 and subsequent growth
between 1970 and ~989. No such tendency is found overall in the world economy
during this time period. Many poor countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan
Africa, not only fail to grow faster than the rich countries; they in fact
experience negative per capita growth, so that the gap between these countries
and the rich countries widens significantly.
Romer's theoretical model and empirical insight set off a decade-long
debate which still continues. Many authors, such as Dowrick and Nguyen (1989),
demonstrated that convergence seemed to hold among the richest countries alone,
specifically those countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 4. Baumol and others suggested that there may be a
"convergence club," meaning a subset of countries for which convergence applies,
while countries outside of "club" would not necessarily experience convergence
via-a-vis those in the club:
It also seems clear that convergence does not apply to the poorest of the
world's economies, though the line separating those eligible for
membership in the convergence club and those foreclosed from membership
has not been determined definitively. (Baumol, 1994, p. 82)
Baumol suggested that only countries with an adequate initial level of human
capital endowments can take advantage of modern technology to enjoy the
possibility of convergent growth. Baumol (1994, p. 65) therefore speaks of the
"advantages of moderate backwardness," arguing that while middle-income
developing countries can take advantage of their lag in technology to borrow from
abroad, the poorest countries are unable to bridge the gap in technology and
knowledge.
Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) introduced a related
The exact definitions of the data and the selection of countries is
described in the Appendix.
4 Interestingly, Williamson (1993) presents further evidence that among
the current members of the OECD, convergence has been going on since 1850,
interrupted only by the four decades between 1913 and 1950.
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notion of "conditional convergence," in which countries purportedly differ in
their long-run per capita income levels, with each country tending to grow more
rapidly the greater is the gap between its initial per capita income level and
its~ long-run per capita income level. Formally, country i is assumed to have
the long-run per capita income level Yi*' and initial per capita income level
Yi' The rate of growth,
gap between Yi* and Yi
Yi' is assumed to be an increasing function of the
(1)
A positive value of ~ is said to signify conditional convergence. In turn, Yi*
is proxied by certain "structural" variables, such as the initial level of human
capital, according to an equation Yi* = l:rji Zji' Barro and co-authors then
estimate a regression equation of the form:
(2 )
They tend to find a positive and significant coefficient for ~ and significant
coefficients on several structural variables ZS. Like Baumol, Barro 1991, p.
409) concludes that:
A poor country tends to grow faster than a rich country, but only for a
given quantity of human capital; that is, only if the poor country's human
capital exceeds the amount that typically accompanies the low level of per
capita income.
In summary, there have been three dominant explanations offered in the
literature for the absence of convergence in Figure 1. The first holds that
productive technology is intrinsically kind to the technological leader: the rich
tend to grow richer as a result of increasing returns to scale in one form or
5 The finding of conditional convergence is now fairly well established
in the empirical literature. A number of studies have found this result using
post-WWII data with different conditioning variables. The list of such
studies includes Barro (1991), DeLong and Summers (1991), King and Levine
(1993), Levine and Renelt (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and Sachs and
Warner (1994).
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another. 6 The second holds that convergence is a fact of life, but only among
countries with a sound human capital base for using modern technology. The third
holds that currently poor countries simply have low long-term potential (Yi*) ,
though countries do tend to grow faster the greater the gap between their current
income and their own long-run potential. Any of these explanations, if correct,
would lead to profoundly pessimistic conclusions for the poorest countries. Each
concept suggests that the poorest countries will be unable to achieve rapid
growth needed to close the gap with the richer countries.
We believe that all of these explanations of Figure 1 are too pessimistic
regarding the potential for growth and convergence of the poorest countries.
Economic growth, and therefore economic convergence, requires reasonably
efficient economic institutions. Poorly managed economies -- such as those with
the absence of secure property rights, autarkic trade policies, inconvertible
currencies, and so forth -- are unlikely to experience convergence no matter what
the underlying production technology or initial level of human capital. Since
many, if not all, of the non-convergent countries failed to maintain adequate
economic institutions during the post-war era, it is possible that it is
reversible policy failures, rather than technology or human capital that explains
their failure to grow. Put another way, the I1convergence club l1 is better defined
according to policy choices rather than initial levels of human capital. We
would also suggest that poor policy choices are reversible, not irrevocably
linked to low levels of income'.
6" Increasing returns to scale is shorthand for a wide variety of
technological possibilities, such as learning by doing, spillovers in
knowledge accumulation, agglomeration economies among suppliers of specialized
inputs to production, etc.
, It is interesting to note that in a paper that provoked much of the
recent research on growth and convergence, Lucas (1988, p. 5, based on the
Marshall lectures in 1985) wrote:
Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead
the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia's or Egypt's? If so, what,
exactly? '.' The consequences for human welfare involved in questions
like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them,
it is hard to think about anything else. (emphasis in the original)
We agree with Lucas that the policy question is central and see this paper as
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Such an interpretation is more in line with the cross-country evidence than
interpretations suggesting an intrinsic failure of convergence. When we examine
poor countries that have followed standard market-based economic policies,
including respect for private property rights and open international trade, we
note an overwhelming tendency towards convergence, even among countries that
start with extremely low levels of human capital endowments and extremely low
levels of initial per capita income. In fact, it is hard to find a single case
in which a poor country actually protected private property rights and maintained
economic openness, and yet failed to achieved economic growth. In essence, we
subscribe to a much earlier, and widely cited judgment of Adam SmithS:
Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degrees of
opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and tolerable
administration of justice.
In our view, as in the view of Adam Smith, burdensome taxes on foreign trade (and
related trade distortions such as import and export quotas) are of particular
harm, since these not only distort economic incentives (e.g. pushing countries
towards inefficient import-substituting industries), but they also cut countries
off from international flows of knowledge.
In the next section of the paper, we demonstrate that good behavior in
economic policy has been its own reward: all developing countries that have
satisfied certain unexceptionable conditions on economic policy have experienced
positive economic growth during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, and in almost
all cases these countries have shown a tendency to grow more rapidly than the
developed economies, and thereby to converge. After demonstrating this point,
we then undertake a cross-country regression analysis based on equation (2), to
try to determine some of the specific ways that poor economic policies have
suggesting a basic answer to Lucas's question. Somewhat interestingly in
light of this quote, P. Krishna and D. Mitra (1994), present evidence that
India'S trade liberalization of 1991 has led to increased productivity growth
and lower price-marginal cost markups in a variety of industries.
This aphorism is quoted by A. Leddin and B. Walsh, in The Macroeconomv
of Ireland, Gill & McMillan, 1995. These authors in turn refer to the
citation in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.
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affected the growth dynamics of developing countries.
II. Economic Policies and Economic Convergence
In this section we define a subset of countries that have sustained
"appropriate" market-based economic policies during the period of observation,
1970-89. We then examine whether there is a tendency towards economic
convergence among this subset of qualifying countries during this sub-period.
In essence, we examine whether there is a convergence club for all countries that
have sustained adequate basic economic policies.
Our selection criteria are as follows. We start with the universe of all
135 countries in the Heston-Summers data series, and then eliminate 18 countries
(total population about 66 million) that lack some or all of the necessary
underlying data. 9 We then establish two basic subsets of "appropriate"
policies: one set related to property rights and one set related to integration
of the economy in international trade. All countries that pass both sets of
criteria are considered to be countries that have pursued appropriate policies
during the observation period. We call these the "qualifying" countries.
Countries that fail at least one test are "non-qualifying." We then examine the
growth dynamics of the qualifying and non-qualifying economies.
We note that many authors have previously used political and openness
variables in cross-country growth studies and have often found these variables
to be significant determinants of growth. These studies include Alesina, OzIer,
Roubini, and Swagel (1992), Barro (1991), Bhalla (1994), DeLong and Summers
(1991), Dollar (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Svensson (1994)10. Indeed,
Countries dropped from the sample because of insufficient data are:
Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Iceland,
Kuwait, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon
Islands, Sudan, Surinam, United Arab Emirates.
10 More specifically, Alesina et
instability and democracy indicators.
revolutions, coups and assassinations
DeLong and Summers (1991) use several
price distortions. Levine and Renelt
al. (1992) use measures of political
Barro (1991) uses the number of
and a dummy for Socialist countries.
measures of outward orientation and
(1992) use the black market premium,
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we rely on some of the data series that were generated by Barro (1991), Lee
(1993), Levine and Renelt (1992), McMillan et. al. (1994) and Summers and Heston
(1991) .11 To our knowledge, however, no earlier studies have used such
variables as filters to divide countries between "qualifying" and "non-
qualifying" countries, in order to test whether economic convergence applies
among the subset of countries following appropriate economic policies.
with regard to the property rights test, a country is non-qualifying (i.e.
judged to have inappropriate policies) if it is characterized by at least one of
the following three conditions:
(1) a socialist economic structure, according to the list of countries in
Kornai (1993);
(2) extreme domestic unrest, caused by revolutions, coups, chronic civil
unrest, or a prolonged war with a foreign country that is fought on domestic
territory;
(3) extreme deprivation of civil or political rights, according to the
Freedom House index, reported in McMillan, et. al. (1994);
These criteria are selected because failure on any of them would tend to
undermine efficient long-term private capital accumulation (including human
capital accumulation), which is a fundamental feature of economic growth.
number of revolutions and coups, a Socialist dummy, a civil liberties index,
and measures of openness based on Leamer (1988). And Svensson (examining
investment rather than growth) uses various measures for respect for property
rights, contract enforcement, efficiency of legal institutions, and business
risk, as well as measures of political repression. All of these studies
examine the marginal contribution of the variables on the right side of a
regression equation; none use these variables to sort countries into groups
and examine the groups separately.
11 Interestingly, an association between convergence and openness across
history has been noted by Williamson (1993). He argues that convergence and
global economic integration have been associated since 1850. In the two sub-
periods that saw relatively free movements of goods and factors, 1870-1913 and
post-1950, there is evidence of convergence. In the period of restricted
global trade between the two world wars, one does not find evidence for
convergence. Ben-David (1993) also argues that income convergence within the
members of the European Community was associated with the timing of trade
liberalization.
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(Details on the variables and data sources are described in the Appendix) .
The second test is economic openness. One of the basic tenets of classical
and neoclassical economics dating back to Adam Smith is the economic benefits of
openness, including: increased specialization, efficient resource·· allocation
according to comparative advantage, diffusion of international knowledge through
trade, and heightened domestic competition as a result of international
competition12 •
To test for openness, we include four kinds of measures. First, the
country must not impose excessive quotas on imports. Second, the country must
not impose excessive quotas, or state monopolies, on exports. Third, the country
must maintain a reasonably convertible currency. We judge convertibility
according to the gap between the black market and official exchange rate. A
large black market premium signals inconvertibility of the national currency, and
thereby effective closure from world markets. 13 Fourth, the country must not
be socialist (as classified by Kornai, 1993) .14 In addition, we exclude South
Africa and the two countries located within South Africa (Lesotho and Swaziland)
on the grounds of the international boycott of the South African economy during
much of the period of observation.
Specifically, a country fails the openness test as a result of any of the
following criteria (with details in the Appendix) :
12 Lucas (1988) and Young (1991) observe that much existing theory
predicts a level effect rather than a growth effect from greater openness.
The literature however is changing rapidly on this issue. Young (1991),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Eicher (1993) and Lee (1993) have proposed
theoretical mechanisms by which increased trade can affect the long run growth
rate.
13 As is well known, rationing of foreign exchange to importers at the
official exchange rate is economically similar, if not identical, to a quota
on imports.
14 Of course, the socialist countries fail on the other criteria. We
use the Kornai list as an additional filter only because the other variables
are not available for some of the socialist economies. In particular, by
using the socialist criterion, we are able to classify Hungary, Poland, and
Yugoslavia as closed economies, whereas the data sources we relied on do not
have complete data for these countries.
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(1) a very high proportion of imports covered by quota restrictions,
according to the index prepared by Lee (1993);
(2) for Sub-Saharan Africa, a high proportion of exports covered by state
export monopolies and state-set prices, according to an index in the World Bank
(1993) 15;
(3) a socialist economic structure, according to the list of countries in
Kornai (1993);
(4) a black-market premium over the official exchange rate of 20 percent
or more, on average, either for the decade of the 1970s or the decade of the
1980s (or both) .
Failure on any of these criteria indicates that the economy is operating in
substantial isolation from the world economy16.
The list of non-qualifying countries according to any of the political or
openness criteria is shown in Table 1, and the list of qualifying countries is
shown in Table 2. It turns out that openness is the main determinant of whether
a country isa non-qualifier. Virtually all countries that fail the political
test also fail the openness test, with the two exceptions of Haiti (which had
open trade but which denied civil and political rights) and Thailand (which had
15 The World Bank index of monopolization of exports was constructed
only for 29 Sub-Saharan African countries in the World Bank (1993) study on
African structural adjustment. We are confident that none of the countries
outside of Sub-Saharan Africa that we characterize as "qualifying" vis-a-vis
openness should be disqualified on the basis of monopolization of exports.
More generally, outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, trade quotas are overwhelmingly
on the import side rather than the export side.
16 Pritchett (1993) shows that the correlations between several measures
of "outward orientation" are quite low. This result has encouraged the view
that measurement error is a severe problem with such measures (a conclusion
not necessarily shared by Pritchett). We have three responses. First, we
think that some of his variables actually measure different things, so that a
low correlation is not necessarily surprising. We would put the trade share
variable and the average import tariff variable in this category. Second, at
least two of his variables, average tariffs and coverage of non-tariff
barriers, are policy substitutes. The low correlation (0.36) may simply mean
that some countries have chosen to close themselves with quotas and others
with tariffs. Third, we try to minimize measurement error by using the trade
indicators to sort countries into broad groups, rather than using all of the
cardinal information in' the data.
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open trade but high political instability) .17 Thus, if we exclude countries
that are closed, we almost also exclude all countries that are non-qualifiers on
political grounds. We find later on in the cross-section growth equations that
the political variables do, however, help to explain the rate of economic growth
in addition to the openness variables.
A statistical summary of the growth performance of the qualifying and non-
qualifying countries is shown in Table 3. We see that the non-qualifying low
income countries have lower average growth rates than the qualifiers. We expect,
therefore, that the qualifying developing countries are more likely to exhibit
economic convergence once the non-qualifiers are dropped from the sample. It is
notable that 23 of 29 countries with 1970 income levels above $4,000 passed both
the political and openness tests (income is measured in U.S. dollars, in
purchasing-power-adjusted, constant 1985 prices), in contrast with just 12 out
of 88 countries with initial income levels of less than $4,000. However, the 12
low-income qualifiers have a higher average growth rate than the high-income
qualifiers, which is consistent with the view that convergence tends to occur
within the subset of countries that pursue appropriate economic policies.
The role of policy choices in convergence is dramatically evident in
Figures 2(a) and 2(b), where we divide the sample in Figure 1 into groups of
qualifying and non-qualifying countries. We should note that with very few
exceptions, We see in Figure 2 (a) that the qualifying countries display a strong
tendency towards economic convergence, with the countries with the initially low
per capita income levels growing more rapidly than the richer countries. The
non-qualifiers in Figure 2(b) do not display any tendency towards convergence.
The non-qualifying countries in Figure 2 (b) are clearly the source of the failure
of convergence that we noted in Figure 1.
Even more strikingly, there is not a single country in our sample (which
covers 117 countries and approximately 90 percent of the world's population as
of 1985) which pursued appropriate policies during 1970-89 and yet which had per
17 There are, in addition, three countries that fail the political test
for which the openness variable is not available because of incomplete data.
These countries are: Cape Verde, Liberia, and Panama.
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capita growth of less than 1.2 percent per year, and not a single qualifying
developing country « $4,000 per capita) which grew at less than 2 percent per
year! In fact, with the single exception of Haiti, there is not a single
developing country that had substantially open trade and yet failed to grow by
at least 2 percent per year. In this sense, the openness variable is almost a
perfect determinant of the real "convergence club" in the world economy, a "club"
based on policies available to all countries rather than on a country's initial
level of income or educational attainment. By our count, there are 12 developing
countries « $4,000 initial income) that pursued appropriate policies according
to our criteria, and all grew at more than 2 percent per year.
So far we have analyzed growth per-capita rather than growth per-worker.
The reason is that the per-capita growth rates are available for a longer time
span than the per-worker growth rates, which often rely on less frequent census
data. However, since some theories, (the Solow model in particular), predict
convergence more precisely in terms of growth per-worker, it is worth examining
the available data on growth per-worker. In figure 3 we present the result when
figure 2(a) is redrawn with growth per-worker on the y-axis (covering the period
1970-85 rather than 1970-89). The figure shows stronger evidence for convergence
tha~ before; but we also find that growth is lower than before for the higher
income economies. Based on this evidence, if growth per-worker were available
for the full time period, we expect that it would strengthen our conclusions
regarding convergence, but the minimum growth rate of the qualifying group would
be about 0 percent rather than 2 percent. We plan to examine this further when
data from the 1990 census rounds become available. 18
In summary, we find no cases to support the frequent worry that a country
might "do the right things" in terms of overall policy (both politics and
openness), and yet fail to grow. Of course, economic reforms take time to work,
so that some countries that have recently adopted outward-oriented market reforms
(in the late 1980s or early 1990s) might not yet enjoy high growth rates as a
18 This result that per-worker growth exhibits stronger evidence for
convergence than per-capita growth is also observed by Wolf (1994).
11
resul t of those reforms. 19
So far we have argued the case of sufficiency: a set of good policies is
sufficient to produce a good economic outcome (i.e. convergent growth). What of
necessity? Are there many countries that "broke the rules" and yet achieved high
economic growth? There are seven countries that failed to qualify on one or more
of the criteria and yet that had per capita growth of more than 3 percent per
year during ~970-89: Botswana, Cape Verde, China, Hungary, Lesotho, Thailand and
Tunisia. (Remember that of the 75 developing non-qualifying countries, only 7,
or 9 percent of the cases, achieved growth of three percent or more, while of the
qualifying countries, ~~, or 85 percent, achieved growth of three percent or
more) .
It is relatively straightforward to account for five of these six
"exceptions." Botswana failed to qualify on the black-market premium for the
~970s, but did qualify for the ~980s. It passed all other criteria. Overall,
therefore, the policies have been relatively well balanced, especially in the
~980s. Moreover, since around 80 percent of Botswana's exports are diamonds, and
a remarkably small proportion (less than 5 percent) of the labor force is in
agriculture, Botswana avoided the anti-agricultural biases of most of Sub-Saharan
Africa.
As for Cape Verde, Hungary, and Tunisia, the "successful" growth during
~970-89 is more apparent than real. All three countries pursued statist
development strategies that produced growth in the ~970s and financial crises in
the ~980s and early ~990s. In all three cases, there was a serious downturn in
gro~th at the end of the ~980s, as financial crises hit the government. Taken
over a slightly longer time period, therefore, these cases would not look like
successes and would not be anomalous.
Lesotho was excluded on the general grounds that it was expected to suffer
from the worldwide boycott against South Africa. Otherwise it passed the
19 On the other hand, there are many recent reformers that are already
experiencing rapid economic growth, such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru in
Latin America, and Poland, Estonia, Slovenia in post-communist Central and
Eastern Europe. We lack systematic data, however, to bring the record up to
the mid-~990s.
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remaining criteria. It appears that its small size (population 1.8 million)
allowed Lesotho to make effective use of the South African market (both for goods
and for migrant labor) even as South Africa itself was subjected to international
sanctions.
Thailand is another example that qualifies on all the criteria except one:
in this case our measure for extreme domestic unrest. It is disqualified because
of the large number of coups in the 1970s and 1980s. But as is well known, these
coups reflect a revolving door of Army Generals in an otherwise stable regime
under the Thai King, and with a rather stable economic strategy. Therefore,
unlike other countries characterized by domestic instability, the coups did not
pose direct threats to private investors and therefore did not stifle Thai
economic growth. Since Thailand was very open and otherwise pursued market-
oriented policies, it has been a successful developing country. In effect, it
should probably be classified as a qualifier, although adherence to our technical
definitions put it into the non-qualifying camp20.
In our view, there is only one deep puzzle to these exceptions, the case
of China. It is indeed true that China has violated most of the rules: obscure
property rights, political repression, high black market premia on the yuan,
extensive reliance on trade quotas. Nonetheless, China has experienced a boom.
We believe that China'S success is strongly related to its particular economic
structure at the onset of its market reforms at the end of the 1970s. In
particular, China was a very poor economy in 1978, with three-fourths of the
labor force in peasant farming. The essence of Deng Xiaoping's reforms at the
end of the 1970s was to free the peasant economy from state controls, even while
maintaining the state's grip on the non-peasant state-owned sector (which covered
just 18 percent of the labor force) .
This "two- track approach" (de- control of the peasant sector, with continued
control of the state sector) was sufficient to unleash China's growth and labor-
20 Along these lines, we also ran regressions with Thailand classified as
a qualifier. This slightly strengthened the political variables, but
otherwise there was no material difference with the regressions reported here.
For more detailed discussions of Thailand's case, see Laothamatas (1992) and
Phongpaichit (1992).
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intensive export boom, even though it did not solve many problems of poor
performance in the state-owned sector. Some analysts have also argued that its
boom is fragile as well, and could still be stopped by macroeconomic instability
characteristic of many economies part way between planning and a market economy.
See Sachs and Woo (1993) for further details of the two-track approach in China
and the current macroeconomic problems.
III. Regression Analysis
We now turn to a regression analysis, to confirm and deepen these basic
findings. Various regression estimates are reported in Table 4, showing the
simple bivariate relationship between initial income in 1970 and subsequent
growth between 1970 and 1989. We see in regression (1) the absence of
convergence for the entire sample of countries (the coefficient on initial income
is positive rather than negative, and is statistically insignificant). In
regression (2) we see the strong evidence of convergence within the set of
qualifying countries. The coefficient on initial income suggests that each
percentage point rise in per capita income in 1970 reduces subsequent annual
growth by .013 percentage points. Each doubling of 1970 income reduces annual
growth by .92 percentage points (=In(2)*1.325). In regression (3), we confirm
the absence of convergence among the non-qualifying countries.
The regressions in Table 5 confirm the growth effects of the political and
openness variables in the overall sample. In regression (4), we regress annual
economic growth on the logarithm of initial income and six dummy variables, for
the three political and three openness criteria. For each of the variables, a
value of 1 signifies "non-qualifying" and a value of 0 signifies "qualifying."
Therefore, we should expect negative coefficients on each of these variables in
the growth regression. This is indeed what we find. In each case, the
coefficient signifies the effect on annual growth, in percentage point terms, of
the failure to conform to the particular standard of policy. For example, an
excessive black-market premium is estimated to be associated with 2.25 percentage
points of reduced annual growth (t-statistic equal to 6.0). Extensive export
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controls in Sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to have reduced growth by 1.88
percentage points per year. Socialist countries grew on average by 1.27
percentage points per year more slowly than non-socialist countries, holding
constant other factors. (Evidence from the Pc0st-socialist period in many of
these countries suggests that the growth rates of the socialist countries were
probably overstated during our period of observation) .
In regression (5), we compress the criteria into two variables, a single
political variable (PNQ) and an openness variable (ONQ). Again, a value of 1 on
either variable signifies "non-qualifying" on the criterion. The openness
variable is highly negative and statistically significant; while the political
variable is also negative, but smaller in magnitude and not quite statistically
significant.
In Table 6, regression (6), we replicate the basic Barro (1991) regression
on cross-country growth for our sample and time period. We see that the basic
Barro equation performs as expected over our sample and time period, with
conditional convergence (a negative, significant coefficient on initial income),
positive effects of educational attainment (though not significant), positive
effects of the investment-GDP ratio, and negative effects of measures of
political instability.
Regression (7) estimates the same equation but includes the two dummy
variables for political and openness qualifications (1 for non-qualifiers, 0 for
qualifiers). When we add PNQ and ONQ, we find that the political non-qualifiers
grow, on average, by 1.04 percentage points less per year than the political
qualifiers, while the openness non-qualifiers grow by 1.94 percentage points less
than the openness qualifiers. The rest of the structural variables remain
roughly the same as in regression (6), though the initial education levels are
even less significant. This is consistent with our view that the growth rate
over this period was determined less by initial human capital levels than by
policy choices.
We attempted various experiments to interact the PNQ and ONQ dummy
variables with the right-hand-side variables in the Barro equation, to see for
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example whether the effects of education, initial income, investment, and the
like were different for the qualifiers and non-qualifiers. To our surprise, the
interaction terms generally proved to be small and statistically insignificant.
The effect of policy failure was therefore measured to result in a downward step
in growth, without clearly affecting the conditional impacts of the other right-
hand-side variables.
In equation (8), we add two variables to the basic growth equation that we
have explored in earlier work. The first variable, PXI, is a measure of the raw-
material intensity of the economy, based on the share of raw-materials exports
in total exports in 1970. The second variable, DTT, is a measure of the change
in the terms of trade of the country during 1970-89. As we argued in Sachs and
Warner (1994), there are reasons to believe that resource-rich countries will
experience lower growth than resource poor countries, all other things equal,
because the natural resource base will push resources into the non-tradeables
sector at the expense of the manufacturing tradeables sector. If, as is
sometimes argued, the manufacturing sector is the site of technological
spillovers and learning by doing, then the shift of resources to non-tradeables
could slow aggregate growth in the medium and long term.
As in our earlier paper, we find in regression (8) that the natural
resource proxy variable does indeed help to account for cross-country growth, and
this is true even controlling for PNQ and ONQ. Specifically, countries that
specialized in natural resource exports at the start of the period tended to grow
more slowly than manufacturing exporters. There is also some evidence, though
not statistically significant, that a rising terms-of-trade over the period
raised average growth over the period. While the inclusion of the PXI variable
seems to be justified even after controlling for ONQ and PNQ (which remain highly
significant in the regression), the presence of PXI tends to eliminate the
statistical significance of the investment-to-GDP ratio. Raw-materials exporters
systematically had lower rates of physical investment relative to GDP. When the
equation must choose between PXI and investment-to-GDP as an explanation of
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growth, the PXI variable dominates21 •
In other regressions, not reported in the table, we instrument the PXI
'variable in order to eliminate the possibility that high-resource intensity of
exports is a result of poor growth performance rather than a cause. As in Sachs
and Warner (1994) we use an instrument suggested originally by Adrian Wood: the
ratio of aggregate years of schooling in the country divided by total land area
of the country. Countries with high schooling-to-land ratios should be expected,
on Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theoretic grounds, to be manufacturing
exporters, while countries with low ratios should be raw-materials exporters.
The use of this instrument does not change our finding with regard to the
negative effect of PXI on subsequent growth.
In regressions (9) and (10) we run the Barro equation, augmented by PXI and
DTT, separately for the two subsets of countries, the qualifiers and the non-
qualifiers. For the qualifying countries, in regression (9), the basic equation
remains satisfactory, with evidence of conditional convergence (a negative,
statistically significant effect of initial income on subsequent growth), and
with the continuing importance of the PXI variable. For the non-qualifiers, in
regression (10), there is also (surprising-though not quite significant) evidence
of conditional convergence, with the initially poorer countries tending to grow
faster after controlling for the other right-hand-side variables. Of course, the
constant term in (10) is lower than in (9), reflecting the overall drag on growth
of inappropriate policies.
In regression (8), we had found that PNQ and ONQ reduced overall growth
when controlling for the other variables. Since poor policies might also affect
the rates of investment relative to GDP and the rates of human capital
21 We checked regression (8) for sensitivity to outlying observations by
examining the residuals and leverage statistics (a measure for how far the
data for a particular country differs from the cross-country means). We found
that Sierra Leone and Guatemala have the highest leverage and that Jamaica and
Syria have the highest residuals (there is no country that has a high value
for both). When the regression was re-estimated without these observations,
none of the estimated coefficients in regression (8) changed enough to alter
the conclusions in the text about significance: indeed, most estimated
coefficients rose in absolute value (the exception was the ONQ coefficient,
which fell from -1.4 to about -1.2).
17
accumulation, we would expect indirect adverse growth effects of poor policies
as a result of slower capital accumulation (both physical and human). In
regressions (11) (13), we therefore check whether the qualifying and non-
qualifying countries differed systematically in the rates of capital
accumulation, once we control for initial income and resource-intensity of
initial production (as proxied by PXI). In regression (11) we find that the
openness non-qualifiers (ONQ = 1) had significantly lower investment-to-GDP
ratios, with ONQ reducing the investment ratio by an average of 3.7 percentage
points. 22 Interestingly, there is also some evidence that richer countries have
higher investment rates than poorer countries.
In regressions (12) and (13), we ask whether the increase in educational
attainment between 1970 and 1985 was different for the two subsets of countries,
again controlling for initial income levels and PXI. We find no evidence that
the non-qualifiers had a lower improvement in the coverage of primary and
secondary education than did the qualifiers. It is clear, though, that the more
developed economies had less improvement in educational coverage than did the
poorer countries (as evidenced by the significant, negative sign on initial
income in both regressions) .
Based on the regression analysis, we may make five conclusions:
(1) there is strong evidence of unconditional convergence for qualifying
countries, and no evidence of unconditional convergence for non-qualifying
countries; (2) non-qualifying countries grew systematically more slowly than did
the qualifying countries, so that "good" policies mattered; (3) each of the
policy criteria played a role in determining average growth rates; (4) the role
of the policy criteria remains in place after controlling for other growth
factors, as in a standard Barro cross-country growth equation; (5) poor policies
seem to affect growth directly, controlling for other factors, while poor trade
policies also seemed to affect the rate of accumulation of physical capital.
22 We note that Levine and Renelt (1992), using trade shares as a
measure of openness, also find that investment shares are higher in more open
economies. This is also one of the few findings that they classify as robust,
using extreme bounds analysis.
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IV. Discussion and Conclusions
The absence of strong evidence across countries of unconditional economic
convergence has led to a number of disparate views in the economics profession
in recent years. Some have argued that non-convergence is a technological fact
of life. Others have suggested that laggard countries require special remedial
policies to provoke high-speed growth, lest they get trapped in a low-growth
economy. Industrial policies a la East Asia have sometimes been posited as a
model for such lagging countries. The evidence in this paper strongly calls into
question these views.
A more parsimonious interpretation of the evidence is that convergent
growth can be achieved by all or virtually all countries that follow a reasonable
set of political and economic policies, including civil peace, basic adherence
to political and civil rights, and (most decisively) an open economy, through the
absence of trade quotas, export monopolies, or inconvertible currencies. All
developing countries that followed such a pattern achieved per capita growth
between 1970 and 1989 of two percent per year or greater.
We note again that many authors have introduced political and openness data
into cross-country growth equations, and indeed we use many of the criteria
suggested by others. Our contribution is not to show that trade "matters" for
growth, since this has already been done. Our contribution, we believe, is to
show the strength of convergence among all well-behaving countries. We believe
that this simple and important fact has been obscured among growth theorists.
19
Another way to summarize the message for the poorer countries is to
consider the following matrix. In this matrix, the group of countries with real
GDP in 1970 of less than $4,000 are sorted in two dimensions: those that do or
do not satisfy the criteria; and those that have grown quickly (G7089 > 3.0),
moderately (3.0 > G7089 > 2.0), and slowly (G7089 < 2.0).
All Countries Satisfy Do Not Satisfy
with GDP70<4000 Criteria Criteria
Fast Growth 10 7
(G7089>3.0)
Moderate Growth 2 18
(3)G7089>2)
Slow Growth 0 51
(G7089<2.0)
Most of the countries of course lie either in the upper left or lower right
cells, reiterating the finding that growth is strongly associated with whether
a country satisfies the criteria. What is surprising is that so few of the
countries lie in the lower left or upper right cells. In particular, there is
not a single country that falls in the bottom left cell, of good policies and
slow growth. This fact lends support to the view that the criteria we consider
are 'sufficient for growth. On the other hand, the fact that there are 7
countries in the upper right cell shows that these criteria are not necessary for
growth: some countries have indeed grown rapidly without satisfying our criteria.
We have argued, however, that in fact 6 of these 7 countries really conform with
the general pattern, when difficulties with timing and specific patterns of
policy are taken into account. Only China is really heterodox by our standards,
and even there we have reasons to suspect that China's particular growth pattern
could not easily be emulated by other countries.
The findings above may also be expressed in terms of conditional
probabilities. Suppose a representative poor country back in 1970 found itself
behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance". The policy-makers could know the numbers
in the matrix, but not the specifics of the country, in choosing which path to
follow. Would such a country gamble that it would come out like China based on
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the numbers above? Conditional on closed policies, the probability of growing
at 3 percent or more would be only 0.09 (7 divided by the 76 disqualified
c:ountries with low income). On the other hand, the gamble based on good policies
would yield vastly better odds.
It is natural to ask whether our results are a case of reverse causation,
in which slow economic growth led to bad policies -- for example, if stagnant
economies tried to experiment with trade barriers in order to speed economic
growth. We think this is highly unlikely. In most cases, the "bad" policies
were selected early in the post-war era, long before a track record on growth had
occurred. These countries stuck with the policy choices until quite recently,
certainly into the 1970s and 1980s, the interval of observation. Moreover, the
few cases of developing countries that pursued outward oriented polic:ies did so
in part because of their particularly close security relations with the United
States or with European nations. For these reasons, we believe that it is
appropriate to take the policy regime "as given," for purposes of studying the
effects of policy choices on growth. In a follow up study, we propose to examine
the sources of basic development strategies of these nations, according to
geography, colonial history (if any), date of independence and therefore
experience of government, and economic structure.
In conclusion, we believe that are findings are significant. Dozens of
countries in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union
have recently undertaken market-reform policies that will shift them from the
non-qualifying to the qualifying category of nations. Our results suggest that
most or all of these reforming nations have a good chance to benefit from these
reforms with higher economic growth. Indeed, we can already see the fruits of
reform in several economies in Latin America (e.g. Argentina, Peru, Bolivia), in
Asia (e.g. the Philippines), and in Africa (e.g. Mauritius, Botswana).
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Table ~. List of Non-qualifying Countries,
with score on ONQ and PNQ, growth rates and initial GDP
ONQ PNQ G7089 GDP70
Algeria ~ ~ 2.2~6 ~833
Angola ~ ~ -2.715 ~110
Argentina ~ ~ -0.758 4~69
Bangladesh ~ ~ 1.640 922
Benin ~ ~ -0.935 1138
Bolivia ~ ~ -0.046 ~6~2
Botswana ~ 0 7.~~B 867
Brazil ~ 0 2.93~ 2390
Burkina Faso ~ ~ 1.6~5 399
Burundi ~ ~ 2.500 324
Cameroon ~ ~ 2.~45 866
Cape verde na ~ 3.267 689
Central African Rep. ~ ~ -~.~40 695
Chad ~ ~ -1.848 543
Chile ~ 0 0.443 3695
China ~ ~ 5.5~8 825
Colombia ~ 0 2.~59 2~00
Congo ~ ~ ~.79~ ~58~
Costa Rica ~ 0 1.302 2793
Cote d'Ivoire ~ 0 -0.~62 ~322
Dominican Rep. 1 0 2.282 ~493
Ecuador 1 ~ 2.482 ~760
Egypt ~ 0 2.707 1101
El Salvador ~ 1 -0.009 1740
Ethiopia 1 1 -0.094 287
Gabon 1 1 -0.094 3679
Gambia 1 0 0.347 603
Ghana 1 1 -1.159 1017
Guatemala 1 1 0.244 2004
Guinea 1 1 0.103 353
Guinea-Bissau 1 ~ -0.016 661
Guyana 1 0 -~.932 ~711
Haiti 0 1 0.040 787
Honduras 1 0 0.599 1206
Hungary 1 1 3.466 3373
India 1 0 2.093 703
Iran, I.R. of ~ ~ -1. 696 42~4
Iraq 1 1 -0.525 4270
Israel 1 ~ 2.074 5705
Jamaica ~ 0 -0.571 2688
Kenya ~ 0 2.236 582
Lesotho ~ 0 4.875 387
Liberia na ~ -1.090 949
Madagascar ~ 0 -2.668 ~125
Malawi ~ 1 0.8~6 4n
Mali ~ 1 1.781 389
Mauritania 1 1 -0.697 881
Mexico 1 0 1.418 3951
Mozambique 1 1 -3.408 1461
Myanmar (Burma) 1 1 2.037 392
Nepal 1 0 2.026 644
Nicaragua 1 1 -2.008 2184
Niger 1 1 -2.456 749
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Nigeria 1 0 -0.202 770
Pakistan 1 0 1.572 997
Panama na 1 0.303 2501
Papua New Guinea 1 0 -0.981 1744
Paraguay 1 0 2.368 1434
Peru 1 0 -LOU 2642
Philippines 1 1 1.227 1369
Poland 1 1 2.286 2981
Rwanda 1 1 0.287 625
Senegal 1 0 -0.120 1107
Sierra Leone 1 0 -0.750 1050
Somalia 1 1 0.148 842
South africa 1 0 0.254 3160
Sri Lanka 1 1 2.825 1307
Swaziland 1 0 -0.476 2390
Syria 1 1 2.763 2205
Tanzania 1 1 0.318 431
Thailand 0 1 4.072 1512
Togo 1 1 0.059 620
Trinidad & Tobago 1 0 1.159 6715
Tunisia 1 0 3.601 1400
Turkey 1 0 2.321 2180
Uganda 1 1 0.879 763
Uruguay 1 0 0.572 3876
Venezuela 1 0 -1. 508 7607
Yugoslavia 1 1 2.854 3338
Zaire 1 1 -2.429 643
Zambia 1 0 -2.173 1096
Zimbabwe 1 1 0.987 1072
Average 0.749
Notes: ONQ (Qpenness Non-Qualifier) is a dummy variable equal to 1 (1 means non-
qualifier) if a country scores a 1 on either BMP, SOC, EXM or OWQID. PNQ (Politics Non-
Qualifier) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country scores a 1 on either RIGHT, SOC,
or EDU. See the data appendix for a more detailed description. G7089 is annual growth
in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1989, using version 5.5 of the Summers-Heston
data. GDP70 is real GDP per capita in 1970 (units are 1985 international dollars) .
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Note: These countries all score 0 on both the ONQ and PNQ variables.
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Notes: The two high-income countries that are disqualified because of openness
alone are Mexico and Trinidad. The four that are disqualified because of both
criteria are Argentina, Iran, Iraq and Israel. The twelve low-income qualifying
countries are Cyprus, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius,
Morocco, Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan, and Yemen: The three low-income countries
with insufficient data are Cape Verde, Liberia, and Panama. All three are
disqualified on the politics criteria, but since they are missing data on the
openness criteria, it is not possible to classify them into the 'politics alone' ,
'openness alone' or 'both' classification.
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Table 4. Simple Convergence Regressions
Dependent Variable: G7089
All All Qualifying All Excluded
Countries Countries Countries
(1) (2 ) (3)
Constant -1.239 14.487 2.077
(t-ratio) (-0.797) (6.716) (1.000)
LGDP70 0.362 -1. 325 -0.185
(t-ratio) (1. 774) (-5.238) (-0.643)
R Bar 2 0.018 0.437 -0.007
Mean of G7089 1.495 3.241 0.749
Sigma 2.171 1.226 1. 975
Sample Size 117 35 82
Notes: All regressions in this paper report t-ratios below the estimated
coefficients. G7089 is annual growth in real GDP per capita between 1970 and
1989, using version 5.5 of the Summers-Heston data. LGDP70 is the log of real
per capita GDP in 1970 (in this case GDP70 is measured in thousands of 1985
international dollars) .
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Notes: SOC is a dummy variable equal to 1 for Socialist countries. EDU is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for countries with extremely disruptive unrest. RIGHT is a dummy
•.variable equal to 1 for countries with a very high degree of political repression. BMP
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for countries with high black market exhange rate premia
during either the 1970s or the 1980s. OWQID is a dummy variable equal to 1 for countries
with high coverage of quotas on intermediates and capital good imports. EXM is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for countries with highly regulated, state-run, export monopolies.
PNQ equals 1 if either SOC, EDU, or RIGHT equals 1, 0 otherwise; ONQ equals 1 if either
BMP, OWQID, SOC or EXM equals 1, 0 otherwise. The data appendix has further details.
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Table 6. Growth Regressions based on Barro (1991)
Dependent Variable: G7089
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant 7.036 12.186 17.497 30.114 9.422
(t-ratio) (2.470) (2.654) (5.704) (6.880) (2.133)




LGDP70 -1.013 -1. 361 -1. 841 -2.915 -0.989
(-2.588) (-3.926) (-4.808) (-5.942) (-1.728)
SEC70 3.732 2.149 3.738 1.772 3.237
(1. 729) (1.125) (1. 866) (0.904) (0.874)
PRI70 0.324 0.272 1.272 -1.416 1.034
(0.302) (0.291) (1.125) (-0.933) (0.668)
GVXDXE -5.818 -6.456 -8.318 1.122 -6.153
(-1.574) (-1.985) (-2.521) (0.173) (-1.581)
REVCOUP -0.358 0.840 0.856 -3.402 0.236
(-0.405) (0.998) (1. 011) (-1. 802) (0.246)
ASSASSP -1. 931 -1.354 -1. 652 -1.848 -2.670
(-1. 211) (-0.981) (-1.111) (-0.175) (-1.584)
PPI70DEV -0.993 -0.909 -1.088 0.679 -1.011
(-2.240) (-2.337) (-2.829) (0.389) (-2.212)
INV7089 11.954 7.769 4.736 -0.029 4.680
(3.314 ) (2.363) (1.415) (-0.009) (0.937)
PXI71 -2.454 -3.050 -2.592
(-3.472) (-4.849) (-2.183)
DTT7189 0.729 -0.591 0.101
(1. 287) (-0.642) (0.135)
R bar 2 0.364 0.528 0.586 0.805 0.228
Mean dv. 1.587 1.638 1. 635 3.195 0.711
s.e. 1.644 1.415 1.353 0.764 1.513
N 81 79 73 27 47
Notes: SEC70 is the secondary school enrollment rate. PRI70 is the primary school
enrollment rate. GVXDXE is the ratio of real government 'consumption' spending net of
spending on the military and education to real GDP. REVCOUP is the number of revolutions
and coups per year, averaged over the period 1970-1985. ASSASSP is the average number of
assassinations per million population, 1970-1985. PPI70DEV measures the relative price
of investment goods: the deviation of the log of the price level of investment (PPP I I
Xrate relative to the U.S.) from the cross country sample mean in 1970. INV7089 is the
ratio of real gross domestic investment (public plus private) to real GDP, averaged over
the period 1970-1989. PXI71 is the ratio of exports of primary products to total exports
in 1971. DTT7189 is the change in the log of the external terms of trade between 1971
and 1989.
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Constant -0.127 0.141 0.171
(t-ratio) (-1.648) (3.108) (4.496)
ONQ -0.037 0.004 0.005
(-2.091) (0.424) (0.569)
PNQ 0.009 0.002 -0.005
(0.592) (0.215) (-0.693)
LGDP70 0.048 -0.012 -0.018
(5.621) (-2.352) (-4.378)
PXI71 -0.043 -0.007 -0.006
(-1. 687) (-0.458) (0.500)
R bar 2 0.526 0.078 0.247
Mean d.v. 0.187 0.048 0.024
s.e. 0.061 0.033 0.027
N 103 90 85
Notes: INV7089 is the ratio of public and private investment spending to GDP,
averaged over the period 1970-1989. DSYR is average accumulation of secondary
schooling over the period 1970-1985. Specifically, DSYR = [log (SYR85)
log (SYR70) ] /15, where SYRxx is person-years of secondary schooling divided by the




The data set in this paper begins with the sample of 135 countries
included in the Summers and Heston data set. For most of these countries, the
growth variable (G7089) was calculated directly from the Summers and Heston data.
For seven countries, Comoros, Ethiopia, Liberia, Tanzania, Nicaragua, Iraq, and
Nepal, growth was calculated using 1985 data rather than 1989 data. Growth is
measured as annual growth in per-capita real GDP, and is expressed in a common
set of prices (1985 international prices, in the Summers and Heston terminology) .
Out of this universe of 135 countries, there were 13 countries that did
not have adequate growth data, either because it was not available at all, or
because it was not available for a sufficiently long time span. These countries
were Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Dominica, Grenada, Kuwait, Oman, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent, Solomon Islands, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and United Arab Emirates. So,
in summary, there were 122 countries with adequate growth data.
We also examined a large set of variables in an attempt to measure
concepts such as respect for contracts and property rights, lack of wars and
civil unrest, and integration with the world economy. The variables we ended up









Black market exchange rate premium, averaged over the decade
of the 1970's and 1980's respectively. Source: Picks Currency
Yearbook with updates from World Bank data (supplied by Ross
Levine with help from Jong-wha Lee) .
Dummy variable equal to 1 if either BMP70>0.2 or BMP80>0.2.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country had a score of 4 on
the export crop marketing index, page 238 of the World Bank
study, Adjustment in Africa. A score of 4 means that the
country had a public sector monopoly in purchasing and
exporting products at prices not linked to world market
prices. The study covered African countries only.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country was classified as
Socialist in Kornai, table 1.1.
Variable indicating extent of quotas on imports of
intermediates and capital goods. It is the fraction of code
lines involving capital goods or intermediates, that are
covered by some sort of quantitative restriction on imports.
Includes licensing, prohibitions and quotas. Developed from
UNCTAD data by Jong Wha Lee (1993). Period covered is 1985-
1988.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if OWQI>0.4.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country scored a 6 or above.
(higher means more repressive) on either the political rights
index or the civil liberties index in Macmillan, Rauser and
Johnson, table 1, pp. 8-10.
Dummy variable equal to 1 in cases of 'Extremely Disruptive
Unrest'. Intended to capture disruptive internal or external
wars, coups and revolutions. Constructed by the authors
30
using several indicators. First, countries were assigned a
1 if they scored a 0.6 or higher on the REVC70 or REVC80
index in Barro and Lee (1993). In addition, the following
countries were assigned a 1 because of conflicts: Angola (16
year civil war); Burundi (Hutu rebellion in 1973-74 resulting
in an estimated 160,000 deaths); Chad (repeated battles with
Moslem rebels in the north); El Salvador (12 year civil war);
Ethiopia (extended war with Somalia over control of the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia); Guatemala (repeated conflicts
between the military rulers and the guerrilla army of the
poor); Iran and Iraq (war in the early 1980's) ; Israel;
Mozambique (protracted civil war in the 1980's); Nicaragua
(civil war); Panama (U.S. invasion in the late 1980's);
Somalia (see Ethiopia); Sri Lanka (repeated violence with the
Tamil and Sinhalese separatists); Uganda (invasion by
Tanzania); Zimbabwe (revolt against government of Ian Smith
in the late 1970's).
When countries had missing data on these variables, we made some attempt to
fill in the data. The list of these adjustments is as follows. Hungary and
Yugoslavia were assigned a 1 and Cote D'Ivoire and Hong Kong were assigned a 0
for RIGHT. South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland were assigned a 1 on OWQI,
because trade sanctions against South Africa restricted trade between these
countries and the rest of the world during most of the 1970-1989 period.
Australia, Luxembourg, Malta, and New Zealand were assigned a 0 on OWQI. Even
though the trade policies of Australia and New Zealand have been fairly
restrictive by OECD standards, we do not think they have been extremely
restrictive by world standards.
After filling in these missing data, there remained five small countries
for which we had insufficient data to make an informed assessment: Comoros,
Iceland, Fiji, Seychelles, and Suriname. Adding these 5 countries to the 13
excluded for lack of growth data, there were 18 countries excluded from the
sample for lack of data, reducing the,sample size from 135 to 117.
The two tables below list the countries that were disqualified on either
openness (Table A1) or 'politics' (Table A2). The tables also report the values
for' the main dummy variables, to show exactly why a particular country was
disqualified. The list of qualifying countries can be obtained from tables 1 and
2 in the text. The list of openness qualifiers are all the countries in table
2 plus the countries with ONQ=O in table 1. The list of 'politics' qualifiers
are all the countries in table 2 plus the countries with PNQ=O in table 1.
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Table A1. List of Countries Disqualified on Openness Grounds,
with Reason for Disqualification (1 means disqualified)
COUNTRY BMP EXM SOC OWQID
Algeria 1 0 0 0
Angola 1 0 1 0
Argentina 1 0 0 0
Bangladesh 1 0 0 1
Benin 0 1 1 0
Bolivia 1 0 0 0
Botswana 1 0 0 na
Brazil 1 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 0 1 0 1
Burundi 1 1 0 0
Cameroon 0 1 0 0
Central African 0 1 0 0
Chad 0 1 0 na
Chile 1. 0 0 0
China na 0 1. 0
Colombia 0 0 0 1.
Congo 0 1. 1. 0
Costa Rica 1. 0 0 1.
Cote d'Ivoire 0 1. 0 na
Dominican Republ 1. 0 0 na
Ecuador 1. 0 0 0
Egypt, Arab Repu 1. 0 0 0
El Salvador 1. 0 0 0
Ethiopia 1. 0 1. 0
Gabon 0 1. 0 na
Gambia, The 0 1. 0 n
Ghana 1 1. 0 0
Guatemala 0 0 0 1.
Guinea na 1. 0 0
Guinea-Bissau na 1. 0 na
Guyana 1. 0 0 0
Honduras 0 0 0 1.
Hungary na 0 1. na
India 1. 0 0 1.
Iran, Islamic Re 1. 0 0 1.
Iraq 1. 0 0 0
Israel 1. 0 0 na
Jamaica 1. 0 0 0
Kenya 1. 0 0 0
Lesotho 0 0 0 1.
Madagascar na 1. 0 0
Malawi 1. 1. 0 1.
Mali 0 1. 0 na
Mauritania 1. 1. 0 na
Mexico 1. 0 0 0
Mozambique 1. 1. 1. 0
Myanmar 1. 0 0 na
Nepal 1. 0 0 0
Nicaragua 1. 0 1. 1.
Niger 0 1. 0 na
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Nigeria 1 1 0 0
Pakistan 1 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 1 0 0 0
Paraguay 1 0 0 0
Peru 1 0 0 0
Philippines 0 0 0 1
Poland na 0 1 na
Rwanda 1 1 0 1
Senegal 0 1 0 0
Sierra Leone 1 1 0 0
Somalia 1 0 1 0
South Africa 0 0 0 1
Sri Lanka 1 0 0 0
Swaziland 0 0 0 1
Syrian Arab Repu 1 0 0 1
Tanzania 1 1 0 0
Togo 0 1 0 na
Trinidad and Tob 1 0 0 0
Tunisia 0 0 0 1
Turkey 0 0 0 1
Uganda 1 1 0 0
Uruguay 1 0 0 0
Venezuela 1 0 0 0
Yugoslavia na 0 1 na
Zaire 1 0 0 0
Zambia 1 1 0 0
Zimbabwe 1 0 1 1
Countries with insufficient data for a final classification:
Cape Verde na 0 0 na
Liberia 0 0 0 na
Panama 0 0 0 na
Notes: See above (data appendix) for description of the variables.
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Table A2. List of Countries Disqualified for 'Political' reasons,
with Reason for Disqualification (1 means disqualification)
COUNTRY RIGHT SOC EDU
Algeria 1 0 0
Angola 1 1 1
Argentina 0 0 1
Bangladesh 0 0 1
Benin 1 1 0
Bolivia 0 0 1
Burkina Faso 0 0 1
Burundi 1 0 1
Cameroon 1 0 0
Cape Verde 1 0 0
Central African 1 0 1
Chad 1 0 1
China 1 1 0
Congo 1 1 0
Ecuador 0 0 1
El Salvador 0 0 1
Ethiopia 1 1 1
Gabon 1 0 0
Ghana 0 0 1
Guatemala 0 0 1
Guinea 1 0 0
Guinea-Bissau 1 0 1
Haiti 1 0 0
Hungary 1 1 0
Iran, Islamic Re 0 0 1
Iraq 1 0 1
Israel 0 0 1
Liberia 0 0 1
Malawi 1 0 0
Mali 1 0 0
Mauritania 1 0 0
Mozambique 1 1 1
Myanmar 1 0 0
Nicaragua 0 1 1
Niger 1 0 0
Panama 0 0 1
Philippines 0 0 1
Poland 1 1 0
Rwanda 1 0 0
Somalia 1 1 1. Sri Lanka 0 0 1
Syrian Arab Repu 1 0 0
Tanzania 1 0 0
Thailand 0 0 1
Togo 1 0 0
Uganda 0 0 1
Yugoslavia 1 1 0
Zaire 1 0 0
Zimbabwe 0 1 1
Notes: See above (data appendix) for description of the variables.
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Real GDP per capita from Summers and Heston version 5.5 in 1970
(1985 International Prices).
Same variable for 1989.












Secondary school enrollment rate. Source: Barro and Lee, 1994.
Primary school enrollment rate. Source: Barro and Lee, 1994.
Ratio of real government 'consumption' spending net of spending on
the military and education to real GDP. Source: Barro and Lee,
1994, who in turn used Summers and Heston v. 5.5.
Number of revolutions and coups per year, averaged over the period
1970-1985. Source Barro and Lee, 1994.
Number of assassinations per million population per year, 1970-1985.
Source: Barro and Lee, 1994.
The deviation of the log of the price level of investment (PPP I /
Xrate relative to the U.S.) from the cross country sample mean in
1970. Source: Authors calculation based on the PISH5 price data in
Barro and Lee, 1994.
Ratio of real gross domestic investment (public plus private) to
real GDP, averaged over the period 1970-1989. Source: Barro and
Lee, 1994, who in turn used Summers and Heston v. 5.5.
Primary export intensity in 1971. Ratio of exports of SITC
(revision 1) categories 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 68 to total exports in
1971, with both the numerator and denominator expressed in nominal
dollars. These SITC categories include: food and live animals,
beverages and tobacco, inedible crude materials, oils and fats,
mineral fuels and lubricants and related materials, and non-ferrous
metals. Source: World Bank, World Tables, 1993, for all countries
except Taiwan, Singapore and South Africa. Data for Taiwan was
obtained from the Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1992. Data for South
Africa was obtained from Bulletin of Statistics, The Republic of
South Africa, Pretoria, Dec. 1972 and June 1992, (exports of raw
diamonds and gold were included). Data for Singapore was estimated
as 0.01 based on GDP and labor force data indicating that Singapore
produces no mining, no primary energy and only a very small amount
of agriculture, forestry and fishing products. The data for
Bangladesh is for 1972 rather than 1971. The data for Cameroon was
set to 1.0 -- it exceeded 1.0 using the published data.
Change in the log of the external terms of trade between 1971 and
1989. DTT71B9 = LN(TTB9) - LN(TT71), where TT is the ratio of a
U.S. dollar export price index (1987=100) to an import price index
in similar units. Source: World Bank, World Tables, 1993, and
National statistical sources for Taiwan and South Africa.
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Figure i. Growth per-capita against GOP per-capita.
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Figure 2(a). Growth against GOP I Qualifiers
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Figure 2Cb). Growth against GOP I Non-qualifiers
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Figure 3. Growth per-worker against GOP per-worker.
Qualifying Countries
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